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POST-DATED CHECKS
The recent appearance of a new edition of Brannan on the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law with its helpful discussion of problems aris-
ing under but not definitely settled by that law, suggests comment on
another field of negotiable instruments which is seldom covered.
Ordinarily negotiable instruments are treated as falling into two
classes, bills of exchange and notes. Checks are considered as one
form of bill of exchange. Post-dated checks, as such, are not con-
sidered at all by the Negotiable Instruments Law except in so far as
section 12 provides that "the instrument is not invalid for the reason
only that it is . . . post-dated." But what effect is to be given the
instrument pending its appearance as a fullfledged check is left to be
determined.
It is of particular interest to note the differences which may dis-
tinguish a bill of exchange from a check. The latter is defined. as
being "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand,"1
and that, except as to the time for presentment2 and the effect of certi-
'N. I. L. sec. 186.
[321]
' N. L L. see. 185.
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fication, s "the provisions of this act applicable to a bill of exchange
payable on demand apply to a check." This does not touch the ques-
tion of form. Nothing is dearer than that a bill of exchange may be
drawn on a bank and payable on demand and still not be a check. In
-which case the slight differences of form found in practice between
the two instruments may become of great importance in determining
what effect is to be given to the instrument. What would be an
unreasonable time for presentment in one case and thereby discharge
the drawer to the extent of the loss,' might discharge the drawer
entirely in the case of the other.5 As a matter of practice, the differ-
ence in wording is usually well understood by all parties and the ques-
tion seldom comes up. A check carries the words "Pay to" while a
demand bill usually has the words "At sight" or "On demand" pre-
ceding the order to pay.
But when the instrument is, on a check form, properly dated as of
the day of issue, but containing the statement "Pay to A or order
Jan. I," the question is squarely presented. Many courts have held
that the intention of the parties that the instrument should be and
operate as a check on and after Jan. i, should control.6 To hold the
instrument a bill would allow the payee to present at once for accept-
ance and, on protest for non-acceptance, would allow an immediate
action against the maker, which would be entirely contrary to the
intention of the parties. The better ruling, however, places the
emphasis on form and for the sake of certainty and convenience in
business treats such instruments as time bills of exchange. 7
Where the instrument is wholly in the usual form of a check, except
that it is post-dated, it is not to be confused in form with a bill of
exchange. It is a check in everything except that it is not payable on
demand. Consequently by definition, it is not a "check," nor is it a
bill of exchange allowing of presentment and dishonor. It might
much better, in legal effect, be compared to a time note made payable
at a bank. Both operate as orders on the bank, if presented on the
day of payment," and both, up to that date, represent the maker's
unqualified promise to pay.9 But the time note must be presented on
the date of its maturity in order to charge indorsers,10 while it is well
settled that a post-dated check becomes a check with all its incidents
IN. I. L. sec. 187-8. 'N. L L. sec. i86.
'N. I. L. sec. 70.
I Champion v. Gordon (872) 7o Pa. 474; In re Brown (1843, C. C. D. Mass.)
2 Story, 5o2; Way v. Towle (1892) 755 Mass. 374, 29 N. E. 5o6; Westminster
Bank v. Wheaton (1856) 4 R. L 30.
"Harrison v. Nicollet National Bank (I889) 41 Min. 488, 43 N. W. 336;
Morrison v. Bailey (1855) 5 Oh. St. 13; Mintern v. Fisher (1854) 4 Calif. 35;
Ivory v. State Bank (1865) 36 Mo. 475; Bowen v. Newell. (853) 8 N. Y. i9o.
'N. I. L. sec. 87.
"Camas Prairie State Bank v. Newman (i9og) i5 Ida. 7,9, 99 Pac. 833.
" . L L. see. 70.
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when the due day arrives,"1 and thus has an extra period for presenta-
tion. It is that period in the interim when the instrument certainly is
not a bill of exchange, in the sense that it can be accepted or protested,
and when just as certainly it is not a check, not being payable on
demand, that is peculiar. The Negotiable Instruments Law provides
for no class of instruments intermediate between a check and a bill of
exchange. A post-dated check has elements of both, but during the
time preceding its date, while it may be said to be a "check in abey-
ance," it is yet distinctive, and to liken it to either. may tend to confuse.
The only way to determine the exact rights, privileges, powers and
immunities that may pertain to a post-dated check, to decide just what
a post-dated check is, is not to give the instrument the one name or
the other, but to look to the decisions on each particular question
which may be raised in regard to it. It goes almost without saying
that post-dated checks are valid and negotiable. Section 12 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law would suffice to settle this, but it is fully
backed up by decisions.12  Early in their existence it was held that
they are not drafts payable on demand, but are payable at a future
day and therefore require the same stamp tax as any time instrument.1 "
In cases where they have been treated simply as bills of exchange, a
distinction would not have been material to the decision.14 The use
of post-dated checks is so well accepted that there is nothing in the
fact that it is post-dated to put one on notice.1 5 And so negotiation
before maturity to a bona fide holder for value cuts off all personal
defences existing between the maker and his payee. That a post-
dated check cannot be "paid" in advance of its date, so as to extin-
guish pro tanto the bank's debt to its depositor, seems reasonable. A
refusal on the part of the bank to honor the instrument before its. due
date, is in no sense a dishonor allowing an immediate action against
the maker.1 7  The bank can only debit the depositor's account by
payments at the time, to the person, and for the amount authorized by
him. 8 And where the bank has paid the check before date, it is
still liable to the depositor for the amount. 9 Though, like a drawee
U Wilson v. McEachern (1911) 9 Ga. App. 584, 71 S. E. 946; Mohawk Bank v.
Broderick & Powell (1834, N. Y. Ct. Err.) 13 Wend. 133; Gough & Herring
v. Staats (1835, N. Y. Sup. C) 13 Wend. 549.
'Frazier v. Travis P. and B. Company (i88i, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 24 Hun. 281.
'Allen v. Keeves (x8oi, K. B.) x East, 435. They have since been held
properly stamped as bills payable on demand. Royal Bank v. Tottenham [18941
2 Q. B. 7,5.
" Cf. Forster v. Mackreth (1867) i6 L. T. N. S. 23.
"' Brewster v. McCardel (1832, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 8 Wend. 478.
'Mayer v. Mode (i878, N. Y.) 14 Hun. 155; Symonds v. Riley (igo5) 188
Mass. 47o, 74 N. E. 926.
Wilson v. McEachern, supra.
SCf. Wheeler v. Guild (1838, Mass.) 20 Pick 545.
"Godin v. Bank of the Commonwealth (i856, N. Y. Super. Ct) 6 Duer, 76.
323.
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discounting a bill, it could have held the checks until their date and
thus had the same claim against the maker as any endorsee for value.2"
In fact, a post-dated check held by the drawee bank for collection has
priority of payment, on penalty of the bank' being liable to the extent
of the shortage, if other paper is paid during the day depleting the
funds.2 1 But a change in date accelerating payment is material and
the bank cannot thereafter charge its depositor's account though it
paid in ignorance of the change.
22
A nice question appears. as to the effect of a post-dated check given
in payment of a pre-existing debt. If the analogy of the post-dated
check to a time note is to prevail, the usual rule would be that such
payment should bar suit on the original cause of action until the due
date had arrived.23  On the other hand, ordinary checks given in pay-
ment of a debt are, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, held
to be a discharge of the indebtedness only when paid.2 ' The question
as to whether they suspend a right of action on the debt until pre-
sented for payment does not seem to be considered. Logically, a
post-dated check, pending its due date, should suspend the creditor's
right of action on the debt. 25 Certainly, where the payee has nego-
tiated the instrument to a holder for value without notice the drawer's
debt is not subject to garnishment by the payee's creditors until after
the date of the check and its dishonor.26
The question of certification of a post-dated check does not arise
very often. Usually the maker is out of funds and it is, if only for
that reason, ordinarily difficult to secure certification. But where a
cashier .duly authorized to certify checks acts in fraud, the instrument
is enforceable against the bank by a holder in due course. 27 The diffi-
culty with a post-dated check bearing a certification across its face
of a date earlier than the due date is that it carries notice of lack of
authority in the cashier; the presumpti6n being that it was drawn on
no funds. Therefore, a subsequent taker cannot recover of the
drawee bank.28 And it was so held, even though the holder secured
"See Swope v. Ross (1861) 40 Pa. 186; Desha Shephard & Co. v. Steward
(1844) 6 Ala. 852.
Washington Second National Bank v. Averill (1894, D. C.) 2 App. Cas. 470.
Crawford v. West Side Bank (885) ioo N. Y. 5o, 2 N. E. 88r.
Martens-Turner Co. v. Mackintosh (1897) 17 App. Div. 41g, 45 N. Y. Supp.
275.
" United States National Bank v. Shupak (i918) 54 Mont. 542, 172 Pac. 324;
Kinard v. First National Bank (i9o6) 125 Ga. 228, 53 S. E. ioi8.
'A very unsatisfactory decision allows an action by the creditor on returning
the post-dated check before its due date. Lockwood Trade Journal v. N. Y.
Silicate Book Slate Co. (I9o4, Sup. Ct.) 88 N. Y. Supp. 152.
"Wilson v. McEachern, supra.
'Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Butchers & Drovers Bank (i857) i6 N. Y.
125; Detroit National Bank v. Union Trust Co. (i9o6) z45 Mich. 656, xo8
N. W. io92.
"Clark National Bank v. 41ank of Albion (i868) 52 N. Y. 593.
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the bank president's promise that the check would be met.29  How-
ever, if the certification carried no date and the transfer was made by
the holder on or after the due date, there would be no actual notice
and it would follow the bank would be liable.
But certification at the instance of the maker presents a different
problem. It has been held that on such certification the bank must
appropriate sufficient funds of the depositor at once to meet the
check.30 And in such a case the presumption is that there were funds
and a subsequent taker can enforce the check against the drawee
bank.31 This presumption of regularity should allow a taker before
date to stand on the same footing as if he. had taken after the due
date without notice. But if the transfer is made by, the payee
before date it is impossible for the indorsee to tell who had it certified.
Very probably an indorsee in such case will be held to take at his peril.
Practically, post-dated checks are in wider use and better repute
than is usually accredited them. They possess all the advantages of
payment by check coupled with a time element. It would seem very
unwise for a maker to have his post-dated check certified, however,
as he loses control of his deposit and interest and, if the bank were
to fail, probably would not be discharged of the debt. But from the
maker's standpoint an ordinary post-dated check is better than pay-
ment by time bill because it cannot be dishonored and protested with
an immediate demand of payment. It should also, as has been shown
above, amount to a suspension of the creditor's claim on the original
debt. From the taker's standpoint, there is an advantage in that pre-
sentment need not be made on the exact day in order to charge the
drawer or indorsers. Hence it is submitted that post-dated checks
should find fuller recognition and come to fill their particular place
of usefulness among the different types of commercial paper.
REVERSED JUDGMENT AS EVIDENCE IN MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
In a suit for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must prove both the
termination of the original action brought by the present defendant
and a want of probable cause to justify the institution of that action.
If the original prosecution resulted in a conviction the plaintiff suing
for malicious prosecution would find himself offering in evidence a
fact from which an inference might be drawn that there was probable
cause, thus fortifying the case of the defendant. The probative force
"Swenson Bros. Co. v. Commercial State Bank (1915) 98 Nebr. 7o2, 154
N. W. 233.
"Smith v. Fields (1911) i9 Ida. 558, 114 Pac. 668. This court held that
the bank became liable immediately on certifying the check and that payment
could be demanded at any time on presentment.
'Merchants & Planters Bank v. First National Bank (914) 116 Ark. 1, 170
S. W. 852.
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of evidence of a conviction which was subsequently reversed is still
the subject of a rather complicated discussion. Recently, in Kennedy
v. Burbridge,' the Utah Supreme Court, although abusing the terms
employed, followed the weight of authority and held that the plaintiff,
by alleging and proving that there had been a conviction followed by
a reversal, had presented evidence, the effect of which was to support
the defendant's contention that there was probable cause, which would
be overcome only by proof that the judgment was obtained by fraud,
perjury, or subornation.
Early courts were anxious to protect prosecutors and gave great
weight to the decision and circumstances of the original prosecution,
whatever its termination. In 1748, in Reynolds v. Kennedy,2 it was
held that a condemnation of articles by sub-commissioners of revenue
was conclusive of probable cause in any subsequent suit for maliciously
bringing the proceedings, though later the articles were ordered
returned by the commissioners. A while later the courts gave equal
weight to the mere fact that a jury had paused before rendering an
acquittal, although the defendant had not been put "on his defence."8
But a reaction followed, and some courts were soon found holding
that even a conviction by a jury, if subsequently reversed, was only
"strong presumptive" evidence of probable cause.4 Considerable con-
fusion resulted, since courts failed to classify carefully either the
amount of weight to be given the judgments, or the differences in the
kinds of judgments they were noticing.
As to the weight of the judgments-one court held that a mere
record .of the earlier conviction, even though reversed, was final, and
was even prepared to reject evidence that a judgment was obtained by
fraud.8 On the other hand it was held that a reversal created a
status quo ante and that consequently evidence of the conviction had
no probative value.6 But the majority of the courts contented them-
selves with declaring that the reversed judgment had the weight of
"conclusive," or else of "prima facie," evidence, without defining
those terms.7 It is clear, however, that the courts use the terms in
(igig, Utah) 183 Pac. 325.
"(1748, Y. B.) I Wils. 232.
'Smith v. MacDonald (1799, N. P.) 3 Esp. 7; followed in Grant v. Duel
(1842) 43 La. 17; see also 2 Starkie, Evidence (ist ed. i826) 916.
'Goodrich v. Warner (1852) 21 Conn. 431, 443.
Griffis v. Sellars (837) i9 N. C. 492, 3 Am. Dec. 4=, note.
'Richter v. Koster (874) 45 Ind. 440.
'The result has been amusing. The Minnesota court, in Skeflington v. Eyl-
ward (i9o6) 97 Minn. 244, io5 N. W. 638, divided the cases into three classes,
and, using the word "conclusive" to mean "conclusive if not overcome by
fraud," found that its classes one and two were the same. Then the Utah
court, in Kennedy v. Burbridge, supra, after citing the Minnesota court at
length, and adopting its classification, used "prima facie" in a sense that
included its predecessor's use of conclusive, and decided that classes two 'and
three were the same. The result was a mathematical demonstration that the
words "conclusive" and "pima facie" were synonymous.
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two dearly different senses: evidence of a judgment is "conclusive"
if it is final unless judgment be shown to have been obtained by fraud;
it is "prima facie" evidence if other evidence beside that of fraud
in obtaining the verdict is admissible. The rather extraordinary hold-
ings mentioned above can be disregarded, and it is safe to use the
terms "conclusive" ,and "prima facie," as defined above, in classify-
ing judgments and the. weight they deserve.
Findings which do not result in a formal conviction by a jury or a
justice of the peace are nowhere held to have more than prima facie
force.8 Among the decisions that* do have such force, however, are
a finding by a justice of probable cause in issuing a warrant,9 binding
over to trial,10 commitment,1 indictment by a grand jury,12 and a
commitment to an insane asylum.13  It is evident that the holdings
that the mere fact that a jury paused before rendering an acquittal
is conclusive are anomalous, as a disagreement after twenty-seven
hours of deliberation is not now given such weight.14 But if there be
a conviction, and no subsequent reversal, the judgment is conclusive,
whether it resulted from a trial by jury,15 a justice of the peace,'8 or
a police court.17 The conviction must, however, have been of the
offense for which the plaintiff was prosecuted by the defendant, and
not for a lesser one. 8
What is the effect of a reversal? In answering this question, it is
necessary to regard the nature of both the "reversal" and the original
conviction. Merely the granting of a new trial will not terminate a
'Bacon v. Towne (1849, Mass.) 4 Cush. 217; Spalding v. Lowe (i885) 56
Mich. 366, 23 N. W. 46;. Ash v. Marlowe (1851) 2o Ohio, 9ig; Raleigh v.
Cook (1883) 6o Tex. 438, and cases infra.
'Ross v. Hixon (189) 46 Kan. 55o, 26 Pac. 955. If there is a waiver of the
preliminary examination the effect is the same as if there had been a finding.
Hess v. Oregon Baking Co. (1897) 31 Ore. 5o3, 49 Pac. 8o3.
"Bacon v. Towne, supra; Bechel v. Pacific Express Co. (I9O2) 65 Neb. 826,
91 N. W. 853.
'Ewing v. Sanford (1851) 19 Ala. 6o5; Bauer v. Clay (1871) 8 Kan. 58o;
Ganea v. Southern Pac. R. R. (1875) 51 Calif. 14o; Diemer v. Herber (1888)
75 Calif. 287, 17 Pac. 205.
'Casey v. Dorr et al. (i9io) 94 Ark. 433, 127 S. W. 708; Ricord v. Central
Pac. R. R. (i88o) 15 Nev. 167; contra, Peck v. Choutean (1886) 91 Mo. I3%
3 S. W. 577.
"Kellog v. Cochrane (1892) 87 Calif. 192, 25 Pac. 677.
" Barker v. Scott (1894) 92 Iowa, 52, 6o N. W. 497.
"As the plaintiff must aver the termination of the original action in his favor,
evidence of a final conviction is conclusive as to two facts which he must prove.
" Witham v. Gowen (1837) 14 Me. 362; Payson v. Caswell (i84) 22 Me. 212.
'TMorrow v. Wheeler Mfg. Co. (3896) 165 Mass. 349, 43 N. E. io5.
' Labar v. Crane (1883).49 Mich. 561, 14 N. W. 495. It is clear that if the
defendant prosecuted the plaintiff for assault with intent to kill and he was
convicted of assault and battery, that conviction would not warrant an infer-
ence as to the causes justifying the bringing of the prosecution for assault with
intent to kill.
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prosecution (and the plaintiff must prove termination), but the prose-
cution may be ended before the appellate court, either by a judgment
for the defendant and his consequent discharge, or by order for a
new trial followed by the entry of a nolle prose quV* The courts
have not distinguished between these "reversals" except in the rare
cases which hold that peculiar significance should be given to a rever-
sal of judgment on the finding of fact." But different weight has
been given the "reversed" judgments of trials by juries and by
justices of the peace. The former are practically always held conclu-
sive," but only a respectable majority of the cases give such weight
to the conviction by a justice if reversed 2 The classification above
disposes of most possible conclusions of a prosecution, except an
acquittal on retrial. There is authority for the holding that the orig-
inal conviction then has the weight of prima facie evidence only," but
it is difficult to see why such an acquittal in a second trial should more
effectively overcome the inference to be drawn from the prior convic-
tion than would an acquittal by an appellate court on the findings of
fact, a reversal followed by a discharge, or the granting of a new trial
followed by the entry of a nolle prosequi.
Barring inevitable minor inconsistencies, the actual ruling of courts
on the question of probable cause has been more uniform than a hasty
reading of their opinions would indicate. By giving to proof of a
One case, it is true, holds that "nothing short of an acquittal will answer
where the prosecution has progressed to a trial by a petit jury." Kirkpatrick v.
Kirkpatrick (x861) 39 Pa. 288. But the court's diffculty related to the question
of the necessity of an averment that the prosecution ended in favor of the
plaintiff. Evidently only an acquittal has that weight--a new variation of the
idea of Scotch verdict.
"Nehr v. Nobbs (1896) 47 Neb. 870, 66 N. W. 866.
Grifls v. Sellars, supra (conclusive even if fraudulently obtained); Parker
v. Farley (1852) 64 Mass. (xo Cush.) 279; Carpenter v. Sibley (19o8) 153
Calif. 215, 94 Pac. 879, In Goodrich v. Warner, supra, when there had been a
previous conviction by a jury, it was not held conclusive. In Knight v. Interna-
tional C. G. N. Ry. (x894, C. C. A. 5th) 61 Fed. 87, it was held that the evidence
had at least the weight of a prima facie case, there being no need to find more
to establish grounds for a reversal.
'Conclusive: Whitney v. Peckham (1818) 15 Mass. 243; Herrman v. Brook-
erhof (1839, Pa.) 8 Watts, 24o; Cloon v. Gerry (1859, Mass.) 13 Gray, 201;
Phillips v. Kalamazoo (1884) 53 Mich. 33, 18 N. W. 547; Adams v. Bicknell
(i89o) 126 Ind. 210, 25 N. E. 8o4; Saunders v. Baldwin (1911) 112 Va. 431, 71
S. E. 62o. Burt v. Place (i83o, N. Y.) 4 Wend. 591 recognizes the doctrine, but
holds that evidence that the defendant knew that there was no cause, like evi-
dence of fraud, will overcome the effect of the conviction.
Prima facie: Nicholson v. Sternberg (i9oi, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 7o N. Y. Supp. 212;
Skeffington v. Eylward, supra. In Womack v. Circle (i877, Va.) 29 Gratt 192,
there was an even division of the court, two of the judges considering evidence
of the conviction conclusive, and two arguing that it had only the weight of
prima facie evidence.
'MacDonald v. Schroeder (19o6) 214 Pa. 411, 63 AtI. 1o24. See also Palmer
v. Avery (1864, N. Y. Sup. Pt) 41 Barb. 290, 296.
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valid conviction the weight of conclusive evidence, they afford prac-
tical protection to prosecutors and curtail a large amount of what
would probably be futile litigation, and logically it is perfectly sound
to give great weight to the inference to be drawn from evidence of a
conviction, even if it is later reversed. But one criticism is certainly
warranted-that legal terms have been carelessly used and abused.
And it is due to this abuse that some of the decisions cannot be fully
understood, for example, those of the minority which are authority
for the proposition that if the plaintiff, in showing termination of the
original prosecution, proves a conviction by a justice of the peace, an
acquittal, and a discharge, he is making out a "prima facie" case of
probable cause for the defendant. By a "prima facie case," most
courts mean sufficient evidence to justify a verdict for the party intro-
ducing it, without the introduction of other evidence. But here the
burden of proof of want of probable cause and, with it, the burden of
proceeding with the evidence is on the plaintiff anyhow. Conse-
quently, in the absence of any evidence at all, the defendant is entitled
to a verdict. To conclude that the introduction of evidence of the
previous conviction makes out a "prima facie" case, means that the
defendant has, in the absence of contrary evidence, a second claim to
a verdict, and the first is adequate. What is meant by courts? Simplr
that, in proving the conviction and subsequent reversal, in order to
satisfy the requirement that proof be given of one of the essential
facts: unsuccessful termination of the original prosecution, the plain-
tiff has given strong evidence of the existence of probable cause. This
evidence he must proceed to overcome in order to make out even a
prima facie case-and it with any other evidence in order to sustain
the burden.of proof-as to that second necessary fact-want of prob-
able cause. How strong the evidence is-whether almost conclusive,
or almost negligible-no court has attempted to decide. The resort to
the term "prima facie," which has covered a multitude of meanings,
is responsible for this.
RULES OF CONFLICT AND OF CONSTRUCTION IN APPLYING FOREIGN
STATUTES
When a foreign statute is offered as governing a particular matter
in suit, the court of the forum may be required to perform two funda-
mentally different functions: first, the resolution of conflicts between
rival systems of law thus offered; second, the investigation of the
intrinsic meaning of the particular statute. In the former problem the
court uniformly applies the local rules of conflict;' in the latter it
ordinarily adopts the construction of the highest court of the enacting
'Pickering v. Fisk (1834) 6 Vt. i02; Marshall v. Sherman (i895) 148 N. Y.
9, 24, 42 N. E. 41g; Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed. 1883) sec. 36.
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jurisdiction.2 A boundary dispute between these two subjects may
therefore be decisive of a case. Where does the problem of conflict
end and the problem of construction begin? A recent federal cases
reveals in a new light the elusive character of this problem.
An action was brought on a contract made in Michigan for the
lease of property situated in New York. Both Michigan and New
York have statutes of frauds applicable to contracts of this kind.4
The memorandum of the contract in suit complied with the require-
ments of the New York statute; it was not shown to have complied
with the more stringent requirements of the Michigan statute. The
latter was pleaded in defence. The court, sitting in the state of New
York, overruled the defence, holding that under the New York deci-
sions which the court was bound to follow in the construction of a
New York statute, either the lez fori or the lex rei sitae must govern.
If the court had committed itself to the lex rei sitae rather than to
the lex fori, we should not hesitate to recognize the problem as one
merely of conflict of laws. While the constitutional power of a par-
ticular legislature to control a matter in suit is often much more exten-
sive than the province of control accorded to the same jurisdiction
by rules of conflict,5 and therefore it is sometimes necessary to inquire
at the outset how far a particular legislature could go and has gone
in resolving questions of conflict of laws in favor of its own enact-
ments, we should not be troubled by such an inquiry in this case.
Neither the Michigan statute nor the New York statute has been or
reasonably could be construed to decide the issue between the lex loci
contractus and the lex rei sitae.
Both statutes might be held, by virtue of their intrinsic force, to
go to the substance of the contractual relation. Beyond this both
would be intrinsically neutral. The issue would have been exclusively
between the contract law of Michigan as a whole including the Mich-
igan statute of frauds, and the contract law, or the real property law,
of New York as a whole including the New York statute of frauds.
We should then be left merely with the inquiry why the federal court
did not apply the rules of conflict of its own choice rather than to
resort to the law of the state in which it sat.8
IVan Matre v. Sankey (1893) x48 Ill. 536, 36 N. E. 628.
"Hotel Woodward Co. v. Ford Motor Co. (i9i, C. C. A. 2d) 258 Fed. 3=.
'Mich. Comp. Laws, x897, ch. 257, sec. 8; N. Y. Real Property Law, x9og,
sec. 259, Cons. Laws, ch. 5o.
Green v. Van Buskirk (x866, U. S.) 5 Wall. 307, i8 L. ed. 599.
'Guernsey v. Imperial Bank of Canada (igI, C. C. A. 8th) x88 Fed. 300;
McCue v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. (igo8, C. C. A. 4th) 167 Fed. 435;.
U. S. Savings etc. Co. v. Harris (i9o2, C. C. E. D. Ky.) 113 Fed. 26; Mcllwaine
v. Ellington (igoi, C. C. A. 4th) iii Fed. 578; Dygert v. Vermont Loan &
Trust Co. (I899, C. C. A. 9th) 94 Fed. 913; First National Bank v. Mitchell
(i899, C. C. A. 2d) 92 Fed. 565; Evey v. Mexican Cent. Ry. (1897, C. C. A. 5th)
8I Fed. 294.
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In fact, however, the issue between the lex rei sitae and the lex
fori was expressly left open.7 It is possible, therefore, that the New
York statute was procedural in character. Admittedly a local rule of
procedure is applicable to suits in the federal court.8 But how could
this determine the non-applicability of the Michigan statute, the pro-
visions of which had not been complied with and which was pleaded in
defence to the action? If the latter question was one of construction,
the New York decisions were irrelevant; if it was one of conflict,
they were not controlling.9 If, then, the court found that the Mich-
igan statute was substantive in character and that the law of Michigan
was primarily applicable to the contract, why should not that statute
have been applied, notwithstanding the fact that the New York pro-
cedural statute may have been also applicable? Does the mere fact of
statutory duplication itself present a conflict of laws?
Clearly such a double application of statutes presents no unparal-
leled or anomalous situation. Many of the modem death statutes
provide a temporal limitation applicable to the substantive right, and
suits under these statutes are sometimes brought in other jurisdic-
tions.10 The latter surely have procedural statutes of limitations of
their own, and these sometimes allow a period longer than that per-
mitted by the substantive statute. The contention that the local limi-
tation excludes the operation of the other has not been sustained."
How can the case of concurrent substantive and procedural formal
requirements be distinguished from that of the temporal limitations
just mentioned? It is equally impossible in either case to extract
from the local procedural statute a rule of exclusion directed against
the foreign substantive statute. In neither case does the fact of dupli-
cation of regulations involve the necessity of a choice between them.
Both substantive and procedural statutes may be applicable and each
may be applied independently of the other. The procedural rule has
indeed nothing upon which to operate in the event that the substantive
rule has defeated the substantive right. But this is merely the normal
case of a contract void or defective by the governing substantive law,
brought in suit in a jurisdiction under the law of which it would have
been valid.
1 2
We must therefore reject the doctrine that the overlapping appli-
cation of two similar statutory provisions requires the exclusion of one
of them from control. It follows that the operation of the Michigan
statute could not be affected by anything enacted or decided in New
York.
'Hotel Woodward Co. v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 329.
"Buhl v. Stephens (1898, C. C. D. Ind.) 84 Fed. 922.
'See note 6, supra.
"Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Larussi (19o8, C. C. A. 7th) i6i Fed. 66; International
Nav. Co. v. Lindstrom (9o3, C. C. A. 2d) 123 Fed. 475.
'Stern v. La Compagnie (igoi, D. C. S. D. N. Y.) nio Fed. 996.
Accord, 64 L. R. A. 121, note.
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Were, however, the New York decisions controlling even with
respect to the application of the New York statute? With deference
to the contrary opinion expressed in the principal case,18 it is sub-
mitted that statutory construction and statutory application may in
this connection present fundamentally different problems. It is pos-
sible, indeed, that the New York court which held the local statute
applicable to all actions brought in the New York courts did so by a
mere construction of the statute. But it is at least equally possible
that the court first determined the concrete effect of the statute and
then proceeded to characterize it on a strictly conflict of laws basis of
classification. 4 Admittedly the court found in the intrinsic force of
the statute itself its effect in withholding the remedy on a defective
contract without extinguishing the contract itself. But where did it
obtain the further premise, that statutes which merely produce these
enumerated effects are "procedural" and not "substantive" in char-
acter? The latter proposition has no meaning except with reference
to the solution of a conflict of laws question. Did the court impute
to the legislature the intention to make this conflict of laws classifica-
tion? Or did it make the classification itself? If the former, it was
indeed construing the statute throughout the entire course of its rea-
soning. If the latter, the statutory construction ceased at the point
where the substantive-procedural classification began, and all that fol-
lowed was purely a judicial solution of a problem in the conflict of
laws.
It seems contrary to all reasonable presumptions to ascribe to the
legislature an intention to make such a conflict of laws classification
in the absence of a genuine expression of intention such as is seldom
to be found.1 5 All judge-made rules of law are intrinsically neutral
with respect to such classifications.16 Why should not statutory rules
be presumed to maintain a similar neutrality? Our insistence, how-
ever, is confined to the point that the question itself can not be evaded
without grave possibility of error, that it can not be answered without
a careful distinction between the intrinsic force of a statute and its
SHotel Woodward Co. v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 329.
"The follo*ing cases recognize this distinction: Converse v. Meers (i9o8,
C. C. W. D. Wis.) 162 Fed. 767; Leyner Engineering Works v. Kempner (i9o8,
C. C. S. D. Tex.) 163 Fed. 605; Whitlow v. Nashville, etc. Ry. (i9o4) 114
Tenn. 344, 84 S. W. 618. But see Hood v. M'Gehee (1gi, C. C. Ala.) 189 Fed.
205.
"Leroux v. Brown (1852, C. P.) 74 E. C. L. 8ol, and cases following it, in
making the conflict of laws distinctions turn upon mere verbal differences
between different sections of the statute of frauds, have not met with general
approval. Heaton v. Eldridge (1897) 56 Oh. St. 87, 46 N. E. 638; Townsend
v. Hargraves 6I875) i18 Mass. 325; Cochran v. Ward (892) 5 Ind. App. 89,
29 N. E. 795, 31 N. E. 581; Miller v. Wilson (1893) 146 Ill. 523, 34 N. E. IIii.
"See Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law
(igi1) io COL. L. REv. 19o, w ff.
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"application," into which conflict of laws elements may have entered,"
and that the result should not be influenced by the immaterial element
of statutory duplication.
A GOVERNMENT'S LIABILITY FOR BRIGANDAGE AGAINST ALIENS
The Jenkins case in Mexico has served to produce considerable dif-
ference of opinion between the Department of State on the one hand
and certain newspaper editors, on the other, as to the liability of
Mexico for the acts of the bandits who seized and held Jenkins, an
American consular agent at Puebla, for a large ransom. The news-
papers urged an immediate ultimatum and the exaction of redress
from the Mexican Government; the State Department was more dis-
posed to follbw legal principles. The second phase of the case,
namely, the alleged malicious prosecution of Jenkins by the Mexican
Government, involves a different principle, to be discussed presently.
It seems that Jenkins was taken from his house by several bandits
who held him about a week for the ransom which Jenkins' attorney
ultimately paid. The newspapers urged that the Mexican Govern-
ment be forced immediately to repay the ransom and to pay an indem-
nity for the injury to Jenkins. The State Department stated that such
demands could only be made if the negligence of the Mexican Gov-
ernment could be shown. The case is not without precedents, and it
may be of interest to discuss it from the point of view of international
law.
Individuals, whether singly or in groups or in mobs, are not authori-
ties of the State whose torts upon aliens immediately engage the
responsibility of the Government. To bring that about there must be
some independent delinquency of the Government itself, a failure,
after opportunity afforded, either to prevent the injury or to punish
the guilty. A government is not, as is so often assumed, a guarantor
of the security of aliens. Under ordinary circumstances, it is merely
under a duty to furnish governmental machinery which normally
would protect the alien in his person and property. This does not
mean that this machinery must be so efficient as to prevent all injury
to aliens, but merely that it must be so organized that a violent assault
by one individual upon another is only a fortuitous event and that
under the particular circumstances all reasonable measures have been
taken to prevent the injury and punish the guilty. As a corollary to
this principle, a government's duty and consequent responsibility for
breach are measured by its ability to protect the alien in a given case.,
'For examples of the difficulty of determining when a court is merely con-
struing a statute and when it is applying to the statute a rule of conflict, see
Langworthy v. Little (i85j, Mass.) 12 Cush. iog; Emery v. Clough (1885) 63
N. H. 552, 4 Atl. 796.
'Bowley (U. S.) v. Costa Rica, July 2, i86o, Moore's Arb. 3032; Calvo, Droit
international (6th ed.) sec. x274, makes the "facilities at hand" the test of
responsibility. Mr. Hay, See'y of State, to Mr. Dudley, Min. to Peru, Sept. 5,
23
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Commissioner Wadsworth in the United States-Mexican arbitration
of 1868 expressed the opinion that the test of a nation's responsibility
for injuries committed upon aliens in its territory by private persons,
is the enforcement of the laws "with reasonable vigor and promptness
to prevent violence when practicable, or failing in that to punish the
offenders criminally, or to indemnify the injured party by (its) reme-
dial civil justice."2
To render the Government liable, therefore, it has been deemed
necessary for the claimant to prove some manifestation of actual or
implied governmental complicity in the act, before or after it, either
by directly ratifying or approving it
s or by an implied, tacit or con-
structive approval in the negligent failure to use "due diligence" to
prevent the injury,' or to investigate the case, or to prosecute and
punish the guilty individuals,' or to enable the victim to pursue his
civil remedies against the offenders.
8
The "due diligence" rule, of which a few applications have been
enumerated, naturally depends upon the circumstances of the case, and
is sometimes expressed by the phrase that "ability is the test of
responsibility." In the Jenkins case, in order to hold Mexico liable
for the ransom, it would be necessary to show either that Mexico had
had warning of the presence of bandits, as in the Baldwin case in 1887,
and had failed, though having the opportunity, to take reasonable
police precautions to prevent the kidnapping or to apprehend the
marauders, or that some other want of "due diligence" is imputable
1899, 6 Moore's Dig. 8o6. But the apprehension and punishment of the guilty
will be demanded. Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915)
secs. 86, 87.
'Mills (U. S.) v. Mexico, July 4, i868, Moore's Arb. 3034.
"Kane's notes on arbitration convention with France, 1831. Phila., 1836, p.
3i. Piedras Negras claims (Mexico) v. United States, July 4, 1868, Moore's
Arb. 3035.
"Hubbell et al. v. United States (i879) i5 Ct. Cl. 546 (Chinese indemnity);
Alabama claim (U. S.) v. Great Britain, May 8, 1871, 6 Moore's Dig. 999;
Evertsz (Netherlands) v. Venezuela, Feb. 28, i9O3, Ralston, 9o4. The recent
case of "Pussyfoot" Johnson in London, where the police without resistance,
it seems, permitted a mob to assault this individual, illustrates the rule of
governmental liability.
"De Brissot (U. S.) v. Venezuela, Dec. 5, I885, Moore's Arb. 2868; Poggioli
(Italy) v. Venezuela, Feb. 13, i9o3, Ralston, 869; Renton claim v. Honduras,
For. Rel. 1904, p. 363 (refusal to diligently prosecute and punish). Incidental
grounds would be: inadequate punishment (Lenz claim v. Turkey, Mr. Hay,
Sec'y of State, to Mr. Strauss, Mar. 25, 1899, For. Rel. i899, p. 766); negli-
gently permitting offender to escape (Lenz and Renton cases, supra); inex-
cusable delay in investigating the facts (Ruden (U. S.) v. Peru, Dec. 4, i868,
Moore's Arb. x655).
'Unjustifiable pardon to the offenders (Montijo (U. S.) v. Colombia, Aug. 17,
1874, Moore's Arb. i4mI, i444. Cotesworth and Powell (Gt. Brit.) v. Colombia,
Dec. I, 1872, ibid., 2050, 2o85.
'Baldwin claim v. Mexico,, 1887, 6 Moore's Dig. 8ox.
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to her.8 In better organized states this "diligence" has been meas-
ured by the Government's "ability" in the particular circumstances.
Notwithstanding this general rule, cases have not been infrequent
where a more rigorous test of liability has been imposed, notably
against more poorly organized or weak states like China, Turkey,
Morocco and formerly Greece. Here liability for assaults by private
individuals has been predicated, not on any imputed governmental
complicity or negligence, but on the mere failure to prevent the injury.
9
Disregarding thus a certain assumption of risk on the part of an alien
in visiting notoriously unstable countries or regions, the local govern-
ment is apparently placed in the position of an insurer of the safety
of aliens, at least of those that can claim the citizenship of powerful
countries. The weaker countries, notwithstanding their lesser ability
to protect aliens, are thus held to a higher degree of responsibility
for their safety than strong states. This departure from principle has
been strongly influenced by that factor in international relations which
weights arguments according to the physical power of their propo-
nents.
While a consular agent is usually only a local resident business man
who exercises minor consular functions, he has, nevertheless, been
deemed to be entitled to a measure of special protection by the local
authorities not enjoyed by the ordinary private alien.
0 His official
*Marauders in Peru, 1899, 6 Moore's Dig. 8o6; Case of Miss Ellen Stone in
Turkey, For. ReL 19o2, 997-io23. Inasmuch as Jenkins was'taken from his
house in a populous city like Puebla, the presumption of negligence against
Mexico is much stronger than if the capture had been made in an unsettled
region. This factor was emphasized in I9o7 by the British government in its
demand on Turkey for reimbursement of the ransom paid for the release of
Robert Abbott. Reimbursement of ransoms paid has been demanded from
defendant governments when actual or implied complicity or negligence has
been alleged, e. g., in the failure to take proper steps to suppress brigandage.
Synge and Sutor cases (Gt. Brit.) v. Turkey, in i88i, 72 St Pap. 1167. Bor-
chard, op. cit., secs. 88, 171.
"Numerous cases of private murder of aliens in China, reported in For. Rel.
i88o. Japanese subjects murdered in China, 1874, Moore's Arb. 4857; Drey-
fus, Arbitrage international, 176, 177; Lieut. Cooper claim (Gt. Brit.) v.
Turkey, 1888, 8i St Pap. 178; Caldera (U. S.) v. China, Nov. 8, 1858, Moore's
Arb. 4629; Hubbell v. United States, supra (based principally on treaty obliga-
tion) ; Russia v. Turkey, 1826 (Turkey held liable for depredations of Moorish
pirates) 13 St Pap. 899, i6 St. Pap. 647, 657. Five cases of British subjects
injured in Greece, about i85o, by acts of individuals, Baty, 116-118; Marcos ii.
Morocco, igoo (ipoI) 28 Clunet, 2o5. Murder of Italian soldier in Crete, c9o6
(z9o7) i A. J. L L. i58; (igo6) 13 R. G. D. L P. 223; Montijo (U. S.) v.
Colombia, Aug. 17, 1874, Moore's Arb. I42Iff. (absence of power considered
equivalent to omission to use it). Turkey and Morocco held responsible for acts
of pirates from their shores on three occasions, (ipo5) 12 R. G. D. L P. 563-565.
"Insufficiency of the protective measures afforded," an alleged ground of lia-
bility in certain cases in Turkey, For. Rel. i897, p. 592.
"°Attacks on German consulate in Havre, 1888, in Messina, i888, and in
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position alone, however, should not serve to make the local govern-
ment an insurer of his safety, although that doubtless renders it more
difficult for the government to overcome the presumption of negligence
ordinarily attaching to a notorious. act of brigandage in a populous
town.
The second phase of the Jenkins case involved his arrest on the
charge, subsequently dropped, of collusion with his captors, and the
later charge that he had committed perjury in the course of the judi-
cial proceedings. The State Department, which must have evidence
that has not been made public, has taken the position that the charge
of perjury is without foundation, prompted by malice against Jenkins,
and has demanded his "immediate release." We shall leave aside the
incidental questions raised concerning Mexican constitutional law in
the matter of the separation of powers and removal of causes. It is
a fundamental principle that every nation, whenever its laws are vio-
lated by anyone owing obedience to them, whether citizen or alien, is
privileged, free from interference by other states, to inflict the penal-
ties incurred by the transgressor if found within its jurisdiction, pro-
vided that the laws themselves, the methods of administering them,
and the penalties prescribed are not in derogation of modem standards
of civilized justice.1 1
The criminal procedure of foreign countries frequently contains
harsh features and is deficient in many safeguards which American
law provides for the benefit of the accused. This constitutes no
ground for diplomatic complaint, the right of the United States being
confined to a demand that its citizens be given the full and lair benefit
of the system which does exist, without discrimination in favor of
natives or other aliens.12  An alien must submit to the inconvenience
of proceedings that may be brought in accordance with law upon any
bona fide charge that an offense has been committed, even though the
Warsaw, i9oi (1889) i6 Clunet 250; Borchard, op. cit., secs. 86, go. French
and German consuls murdered in Salonica, 1876, 67 St. Pap. 917; 5 Moore's
Dig. sec. 7o4, discusses cases in Venezuela, Peru, Nicaragua, Santo Domingo and
United States. See the following authorities: Vattel, Chitty's ed., Bk. IV, ch.
VI, sec. 75, p. 46o; Phillimore, II, sec. 246, p. 263; Pradier-Fodr6, IV, sec.
2108.
But see case of Servian Vice-consul assassinated in Turkey, i89o, Baty, 224
and Wippernzan (U. S.) v. Venezuela, Dec. 5, i885, Moore's Ar. 3041, which
were not taken out of the general rule of non-liability.
'Mr. Marcy, Sec'y of State to Mr. Jackson, charge at Vienna, Jan. io, 1854,
2 Moore's Dig. 88; Ballis (U. S.) v. Venezuela, Feb. 13, i9o3, Morris' Report,
Sen. Doc. 317, 58th Cong. 2d sess., 375. Borchard, op. cit., sec. 42.
"Mr. Marcy, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Jackson, Apr. 6, 1855, 2 Moore's Dig. 89;
6 ibid., 275. See also the illuminating opinions in In re Neely (igoo, C. C. S. D.
N. Y.) lO3 Fed. 626 and in Neely v. Henkel (19I). 18o U. S. 109, 21 Sup. Ct.
3o2 (by Justice Harlan).
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charge may not be sustained.13 The issue in the Jenkins case arises
on the point of the bona fide nature of the charge. The State Depart-
ment evidently regards the arrest as without probable cause, and dic-
tated by malice. If that is so, there is no d6ubt of the duty of Mexico
to release him'and to pay an indemnity." Jenkins' original refusal to
give bail and his subsequent release on bail given by another does
not weaken his case-though it might reduce the indemnity-if his
allegations of fact are sustained. But the facts are disputed by
Mexico. The case is purely a matter of law and unless other consid-
erations dictate another policy, it would seem that arbitration should
be resorted to. Unless the United States.is absolutely certain of the
facts, and even if it is, the policy of self-help involves consequences
,conducive neither to the peace of the world nor to the orderly develop-
ment of international law. It is one of the defects of international
law that self-help is admitted as a legal method for the redress of
injuries, the plaintiff state constituting itself judge and sheriff. The
political consequences of such measures, or course, cannot be predicted.
Austria's insistence upon the privilege to resort to self-help in the
redress of an alleged grievance against Servia brought about. the
World War.
E. M. B.
FREE SPEECH IN TIME OF PEACE
The question of freedom of speech under the Constitution comes
again before the country with the notable decision in Abrams v.
United States (i919) 4o Sup. Ct. 17. On this case, and on those of
Schenck, Frohwerk and Debs,1 further legal discussion of the restric-
tion of speech must, in the main, be based.
Certain things are clear at the outset. There are principles at the
base of our form of government on which all Americans can agree.
The majority is to rule, and the minority is to obey. Correlative to
this is the proposition that the minority shall have reasonable oppor-
tunity to object before laws are passed, and to turn itself, by peaceful
conversion, into a majority if so be it can. Finally, the minority may
properly be restricted to action that is peaceable and non-destructive;
it is not to object nor to persuade by blackjack nor by sabotage.
Commonplace though these propositions are, it is well to state them.
" Elihu Root in (igo) 4 AM. J. INT. LAw, 527. Trumbull (Chile) v. United
States, Aug. 7, 182, Moore's Arb. 3255, and the following cases before the
United States-Mexican commission of July 4, i868: Collier (ibid. 3244),
Atwood (ibid. 3249), Cramer (ibid. 325o). See also White (Gt. Brit.) v. Peru
(1864) ibid. 4967 and "LaForte" (Gt. Brit.) v. Brazil (1863) ibid. 4925.
"Jonan (U. S.) v. Mexico, July 4, i868, Moore's Arb. 3251; Pratt (Gt. Brit.)
v. United States, May 8, 1871, ibid. 328o; Underhill (U. S.) v. Venezuela, Feb.
17, I9O3, Ralston 45, 51.
'(i919) 249 U. S. 47, 204, 211; 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 249, 252; all the opinions
were by Justice Holmes.
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During the war the matter of restriction on speech was much before
our lower federal courts in the shape of prosecutions under the Espion-
age and Sedition Acts. These acts made criminal the advocacy or
urging of certain classes of conduct, such as forcible resistance to a
law of the United States ;2 also the publication of matter intended to
cause insubordination in the fighting forces of the United States, or
to obstruct the recruiting service.3 Clearly we are dealing here with
offenses involving criminal intent; clearly also, the validity of the
enactments depends on their relation to the First Amendment: "Con-
gress shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." The acts were properly held constitutional. "The ques-
tion in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils which Congress has a right
to prevent."'  "By the same reasoning that would justify punishing
persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally may punish
speech" that falls within the above description.5  There is no cause
to quarrel with this view of the law. As long as only such words
are made punishable as produce or are intended to produce a clear and
imminent danger that they will bring about evils forthwith-so long
the principle of free speech is safe. In practice, now and again, free
speech may nonetheless be penalized. Laws are administered by men.
Men's feelings influence their judgments, as to the meanings of words,
as to the imminence of danger. This is inevitable. But as long as
the tests of constitutionality and of criminality are chosen carefully,
in times of repose, and carefully laid down in the courts in times of
stress, all has been done that can be done to safeguard liberty. The
test laid down by Justice Holmes in the above passages is that of
common-law incitement to crime. It is a sound test. The Constitu-
tion was never intended to privilege sitch incitement.
6
But what constitutes criminal incitement, or urging, or advocacy?
In the lower federal courts words were held criminal for "counselling
evasion" of, e. g., the Selective Service Act.' The test of criminality
'Espionage Act, Title 12, sec. 3.
'bid., Title I, sec 3.
"Schenck v. United States, supra.
'Holmes, J. in Abrams v. United States.
'On this, and on the historical background of the First Amendment generally,
see an article by Fred G. Hart, Power of Government over Speech and Press,
to appear in the JouRNAL for February.
"Fraina v. United States (1918, C. C. A. 2d) 255 Fed. 28, 33, per Hough, J.
No attempt is made in this comment to cite the authorities in the lower federal
courts, nor to group or analyze them. They are exhaustively collected and
digested by Thomas F. Carroll (Igig) 17 MicH. L. REv. 621. The questions
involved have also been examined by Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., with his
usual power and lucidity in 17 NEw REPUBLIC, 66 (Nov. 16, 1918) and (igig)
32 HAzv. L. REv. 932. The writer accords wholly with Professor Chafee's con-
clusions. See also G. Hendqrson, 21 NEw REPUBLIc 50 (Dec. 1o, I919).
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which was upheld time and again was such tendency of the words
used, in the circumstances in which they were used." But tendencies
may be remote or immediate. To state that two notorious persons
who have just been convicted of conspiracy to induce persons not to
register under the Conscription Act, "have made themselves elemental
forces akin to the rocks and trees and rivers . . . ..the inference
being that their greatness grows out of their offense, .... .is equiva-
lent to saying that their unlawful conduct is worthy to be followed."
And, to carry the thought to its conclusion, to say that their conduct
is worthy of admiration is to urge others to imitate it, and is an
offense within the act. In such a case the words are properly read
with a view to the surroundings in which they were used; a possible,
or even perhaps probable, tendency to encourage criminal resistance
to the law is thus established; the necessary intent to encourage such
resistance is inferred from the use by a reasonable man of such words
in such circumstances; and the offense is made out. But no require-
ment is even hinted at, that "only present danger of immediate evil
or an intent to bring it about can warrant Congress in setting a limit
to the expression of opinion where private rights are not involved."'
0
The difference is vital. It is somewhat hard to see how the most law-
abiding citizen can agitate against a law to effect its repeal, without
using words that have some possible tendency to induce violation of
that law. And if such a tendency can be made criminal in time of
war, it can be made criminal in time of peace. In the law in war-time
and peace-time there is in this matter no difference. The difference
is solely one of fact: words which when men's minds are at rest
would have but a remote tendency to arouse them to violence, may in
times of high tension produce an immediate danger of such violence.
A jury, too, may in times of stress find in words an instant danger
which in other times the same jury would not see. These are differ-
ences in fact and in administration; they do not militate against the
validity of "immediate danger" as the only proper test of criminality
of words. It is not, therefore, a cause for concern simply that con-
victions took place under the war measures which to-day appear to be
miscarriages of justice. In part these have, now that conditions in
men's minds are more nearly normal, been corrected on appeal.'
In part they are of the sort which must always accompany the admin-
istration of justice by men: the accused failed to use his right to
'The test of common-law incitement, ably contended for by Learned Hand,
J., in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten (1917, S. D. N. Y.) 244 Fed. 535, and
United States v. Scott Nearing (1918, S. D. N. Y.) 252 Fed. 223, was, with or
without intention, overruled and the test of tendency was upheld in Masses
Publishing Co. v. Patten (1917, C. C. A. 2d) 246 Fed. 24, esp. at 38.
'Ibid., 35.
"°Cf. Holmes, J., in the Abrams Case.
' See (igig) 29 YALE LAw J OURtAL, io.
340 YALE LAW JOURNAL
appeal; or times were such that evidence told against him which nor-
mally the jury would have disregarded in large measure. But in
another thing there is some cause for concern: that study of the
reported cases leads to a decided belief that many of the convictions
would not and could not have been obtained, if the court at the time
of trial had had available, and had impressed upon the jury, the lan-
guage of Justice Holmes in the Schenck and Debs and Frohwerk Cases.
Even so, if the criminality of speech because of its remote tenden-
cies were to be limited to times of war, one might still look upon it
with comparative equanimity. One is willing to endure silence, as he
is to suffer taxes or the reek and mud of the field, that war may pass
and victory be gained. When thousands go to their death it may be
of little moment that some few go to prison. But we know, in normal
times, that party feeling, too, runs high-and class feeling; that an
unrestrained majority is prone to leave minorities but little elbow room.
It is that elbow room that the First Amendment was intended to safe-
guard. In the Abrams Case Justice Holmes, restating and reinforc-
ing his opinions in the prior cases, makes this, fact plain indeed.
In that case the defendants had been convicted and sentenced to
twenty years for "language intended to incite, provoke and encour-
age resistance to the United States" in the war with Germany; and
for conspiring during that war "wilfully, by . . . writing and publi-
cation, to urge, incite and advocate curtailment of production of
things [ordnance and ammunition] . . . essential to the prosecution
of the war." To oppose participation by our country in the campaign
against the Bolshevik government the accused had secretly prepared
and attempted to distribute in New York City pamphlets couched in
language exceedingly abusive of the President: these pamphlets urged,
e. g., immediate general strike as the workers' means of letting capi-
talistic governments-including that of the United States-know that
the workers "would not betray the splendid fightdrs of Russia." "In
order to save the Russian Revolution we must keep the armies of the
allied countries busy at home." The conviction was affirmed, Justice
Clarke writing for the majority: "The plain purpose of this propa-
ganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of the war, disaffection,
sedition, riots, and, as they hoped, revolution in this country for the
purpose of embarrassing and if possible defeating the military plans
of the Government in Europe." On the interpretation of the facts of
the case Justices Holmes and Brandeis differed from the majority.
The dissent may be shortly summarized:
"It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring
it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of
opinion when private rights are not involved. Congress certainly can-
not forbid all effort to change the mind of the country. Now nobody
can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an
unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger
that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms."
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And to constitute a criminal attempt, under the act, to hinder the
success of the government arms, Justice Holmes thought an actual
intent to be necessary to hinder or cripple the United States in the
prosecution of the war. He thought in the instant case that no such
intent had been proved.
But the importance of his dissent does not lie in its interpretation
of the facts. Let him be wrong on that; his opinion remains a land-
mark in the law. "Even if I am technically wrong and enough can
be squeezed from these poor and puny anonymities to turn the color
of legal litmus paper; I will add, even if what I think the necessary
intent were shown-; the most nominal punishment seems to me all that
possibly could be inflicted, unless the defendants are to be made to
suffer not for what the indictment alleges but for the creed that they
avow." And, as to constitutionality, the passage already quoted:
"It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring
it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of
opinion . . ."
We need to know the limits of Congressional power in this matter.
The Espionage and Sedition Acts have been found insufficient to curb
radical agitation ;12 not only is their duration limited to the war, but
they are war measures, and the offenses covered by them relate chiefly
to hindrance of the successful prosecution of the war-although there
is the section making criminal the "publication of any matter advo-
cating or urging forcible resistance to any law of the United States. '11
The Attorney-General has submitted a bill to remedy these faults.
That bill, in Section i, makes criminal the commission, or attempt or
threat to commit any act of force against any person or any property
with intent to cause the change of the Government of the United
States or any of the laws thereof, or to oppose or hinder the execu-
tion of any-law of the United States; such an offense is "sedition,"
and punishable by fine and imprisonment up to twenty years. 4 And
' See Attorney-General Palmer, as reported in the New York Times for Nov.
16, 1919, page i.
" See supra, n. 2.
""Section z. Sedition. Whoever, with the intent to levy war against the
United States, or to cause the change, overthrow, or destruction of the Govern-
ment, or of any of the laws or authority thereof, or to cause the overthrow or
destruction of all forms of law or organized Government, or to oppose, prevent,
hinder or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or the free per-
formance by the United States Government or any one of its officers, agents, or
employes of its or his public duty, commits, or attempts, or threatens to commit
any act of force against any person or any property, or any act of terrorism,
hate, revenge, or injury against the person or property of any officer, agent, or
employe of the United States, shall be deemed guilty of sedition, and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $io,ooo or by
imprisonment for a period not exceeding twenty years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the court." The text is taken from the New
York Times, Nov. 16, 1919, p. 21. The italics are the writer's.
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to aid or abet the making or circulation of any word, argument, or
teaching which advises, advocates, teaches or justifies any act of such
sedition or any act which tends to incite such sedition, is, by Section
2, to be the crime of "promotion of sedition," and punishable by fine
or imprisonment up to ten years.1 '
There is little exception to be taken to the first section. We do not
want our laws changed by acts of force against person or property,
nor by attempts at nor by threats of such acts; and to make such
things criminal is a proper exercise of the legislative function.
16 But
the second section is of another color. To begin with-surely through
haste in its drafting-that section omits any intent clause: the use
of words is made a crime regardless of the intent with which they
were used. It is hardly conceivable that the bill will be enacted with-
out the correction of such an error. And, in the second place, "pro-
motion of sedition" may under this section be committed by the use
of words which justify an act which tends to incite sedition. This
would mean an incorporation into the statute, of criminality solely for
and because of tendency, without regard to whether there was present
danger of immediate evil. Justices Holmes and Brandeis believe
such legislation to be unconstitutional. Whether or not it is, no one
can say. Justice Clarke's opinion in the Abrams Case nowhere
directly touches that question; it neither agrees nor disagrees with
the view of the First Amendment so cogently put forward in the dis-
sent. The Abrams Case may therefore some day be explained as a
mere disagreement on the interpretation of the particular facts
"'"Section 2. Promotion of sedition. Whoever makes, displays, writes,
prints or circulates, or knowingly aids or abets the making, displaying, writing,
printing or circulating of any sign, word, speech, picture, design, argument
or teaching which advises, advocates, teaches or justifies any act of sedition as
hereinbefore defined, or any act which tends to incite sedition as hereinbefore
defined, or organizes or assists or joins in the organization of, or becomes or
remains a member of or affiliated with any society or organization, whether the
same be formally organized or not, which has for its object in whole or in part,
the advising, advocating, teaching or justifying of any act of sedition as herein-
before defined, or the inciting of sedition as hereinbefore defined, shall be
deemed guilty of promoting sedition, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be pun-
ished by a fine of not exceeding $ioooo, or by imprisonment of not exceeding
ten years, or by both fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court."
"It is not intended to intimate by this that this proposed bill or any similar
measure is or is not politic at the present time. How far such measures in fact
serve the purpose of their enactment depends on the conditions of ihe day, and
of the particular measure, and on the method of their enforcement; whether a
given measure is worth its price, considering its means of enforcement and the
various occasions it offers for unwise or prejudiced exercise of administrative
authority; how far excited speech is a safety-valve and how far a source of
explosion; how far the regulation of such matters can better be left to the
states-these are questions of legislative policy not immediately connected with
the main point here under discussion but which should receive their due atten-
tion before the enactment of a speech restriction.
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involved. But there is some ground for fear that it will not be so
explained. The general tone of the opinion gives such ground. To
Justice Clarke the distinction seems merely a technical one that "may
perhaps be taken :" between language intefided to bring into contempt
the form of our government-our basic institution of republican, rep-
resentative government-and language intended to produce like results
directed against the President and Congress-a man and a body of
men whom a true citizen may, at any given time, in war or out of it,
dislike and distrust and feel it his duty to oppose. And the course
of decision in the lower federal courts, treating words as criminal for
their mere tendencies, even though the tendencies be remote, and find-
ing the requisite criminal intent in the mere use of words having such
tendencies, must have been known to the majority of the Supreme
Court. They did not declare that under such an interpretation the
war measures would be unconstitutional. Yet some hope lies in the
fact that they avoided passing on that question.
On certain things, it was submitted at the outset of this paper, all
Americans can agree. The minority is to obey; in its efforts to
change the law it is to refrain from violence. But it is fundamental
to our institutions that a minority shall be free to express itself in
words, to be heard in peaceable objection, and in peaceable persuasion.
The First Amendment has been thought to secure the minority this
privilege. It may be that impression is mistaken. Even so, it is
believed to be a policy fraught with heavy danger to impair that
privilege. Repression of expression has in the past meant disorder;
stern repression, long-continued, has meant revolution.17 Post-war
problems are upon us, neither light nor simple; there is small reason
to hope that their full scope and sweep is yet apparent. We shall
need, and need sorely, whatever help discussion can bring. Surely we
have need to remember with Justice Holmes that "time has upset
many fighting faiths;" that the theory of government under our Con-
stitution has been that men should believe "even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
'TWhen conditions are favorable, there may be, instead of violent revolution,
merely a sudden peaceable displacement of the repressors; as when the old
Sedition Act, coupled with its partisan enforcement, joined in i8oo with the
split in the Federalist Party to effect the removal of that party from our
politics forever. But such favorable conjunction of forces is rare. The final
effect of repression must, on thought, be clear to any man. Conditions are not
unchanging; growing dissent from any established order is inevitable, increas-
ing as conditions change. To choke off dissent embitters the dissenter without
converting him. As dissenting opinion grows, to refuse it opportunity to make
itself felt in our political institutions is to progressively estrange those institu-
tions from the human conditions they are supposed to govern, and whose proper
government is the condition of their own existence. In the end a readjustment
is inevitable, to make the government conform to the governed. If that read-
justment is prevented from taking its normal, gradual, constitutional course, it
will be forced into a course extra-constitutional and violent.
343
YALE LAW JOURNAL
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best
test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market, and that truth is the -only ground on which
their wishes can safely be carried out."
K. N. L.
GRIST FROM THE LAW MILLS
Indicative of a certain trend1 of decisions in Equity is Stark v.
Hamilton (I919, Ga.) 99 S. E. 86I, in which the defendant, who had
debauched the plaintiff's minor daughter, was restrained from longer
associating with or communicating with her. No property right was
involved, except the technical right of the father to the services of his
minor child, and it- was frankly recognized that. the real injury lay
in the humiliation of the father and the damage to the reputation of
the family. The court, however, felt no obstacle either in the absence
of precedent or in the novelty of incident, and was content to say that
the protection of property should not be placed above similar protec-
tion of personal rights. With this statement no one will quarrel.
Undoubtedly the dogma, "Equity protects only property rights," must
be abandoned;2 in the past it has been invoked to cover a palpable mis-
carriage of justice.8 But as the pendulum swings in the other direc-
tion, must we not pause to consider the expediency of the exercise of
jurisdiction, the existence of which may be conceded? That is the
real problem in the present case. Unfortunately it received no con-
sideration.4
There is much to be said for the distinction sometimes made
between artful knaves and guileless fools, even in civil suits where the
fool is seeking recovery of the shekels of which he has been mulcted
in some illegal game.5 Certainly the distinction is well taken when
the subject of it is a defendant accused of a crime in which intent is
a vital factor. In Crane v. United States (I919, C. C. A. 9th) 259
Fed. 480, the defendant had been convicted of using the mails in a
fraudulent scheme to obtain money. He was the prophet of a new
religion; he was the one man who could exorcise (by absent treat-
ments) the thirteen devils who produce human misery; and he could
be persuaded to accept pecuniary offerings when that service had been
'Cf. Vanderbuilt v. Mitchell (i9o7, Ct. Err.) 72 N. J. Eq. gio, 67 Atl. 97;
Ex parte Warfield (1899) 4o Tex. Cr. App. 413, 50 S. W. 933.
'Cf. Pollard v. Photographic Co. (1888) 40 Ch. D. 345, 354.
'E. g. Hodecker v. Stricker (1896, Sup. Ct.) 39 N. Y. Supp. 515; Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co. (1902) 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442.
'The authorities are collected and carefully examined by Dean Pound in a
notable article, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Person-
ality (i916) 29 HAxv. L. REV. 64o.
See (i919) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 2090.
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performed. The instruction which the appellate court upheld stressed
the defendant's good faith as the crux of the case. There is every
reason to commend the ruling; if the defendant was an artful knave,
we are well rid of him. But no reason appears why one bona fide
fool should not without criminal liability give another thought "treat-
ments"--at sufficient distance-for devils or for anything else; even
for pay, if they so agree." It is perhaps a question whether such
thought, being paid for, may fairly be dubbed "free"; but surely it
falls within that freedom of thought with which the law seeks not to
interfere.
7
Give some doctrines rope enough and they will hang themselves;
the trouble is that they tangle up the law considerably in the process.
Under the law merchant no consideration was necessary to support the
promises on a negotiable instrument. When the common law under-
took to force into negotiable instruments its own rules on considera-
tion, there was, for a time, confusion. Finally, with the aid of
presumptions, some prima facie, some "conclusive," and with certain
wrenchings and strainings in the matter of antecedent debt, a set of
rules crystallized out of the chaos which, although anomalous, was
reasonably dear cut and workable. Suddenly, with the Negotiable
Instruments Law, a new factor was injected into the calculation.
"The validity and negotiable character of an instrument are not
affected by the facts that it . . . bears a seal."9  This makes sealed
notes negotiable; necessarily it abrogates all common-law rules incon-
sistent with such negotiability. But does the section make it possible,
by adding a seal to the maker's signature-(together, possibly, with a
recital thereof)"'--to create a note enforceable by an immediate party,
regardless of consideration or duress? That it does, is the doctrine of
Kennedy v. Collins (i919, Del. Super. Ct.) io8 Atl. 48. It has been
currently thought that the only reason for sealing a note was to bring
the instrument under the longer period of limitation sometimes pro-
vided for such cases."1 And it is believed that the better policy, now
'Quaere, whether recovery might be had by such a person as the defendant,
for services rendered under a contract. There is the question of illegality, in
"practicing medicine" without a license; and there is perhaps a question
whether an absent treatment would be good consideration.
"It may be observed in passing that most of us desire much more than free-
dom from interference in our thoughts and beliefs; we desire active protection
in them, at the expense of other people. If I believe chiropractic efficacious,
when you run over me I wish not only to be free to have a chiropractor treat
me; I wish to have the damages cover his charge for his services. This has
been allowed. Cf. (191p) 28 YALE LAw JouRNAL., 615. But it may be doubted
whether the same rule would hold, of the price of one of the defendant's exor-
cizings.
'Sec. 6.
10Cf. I Daniel, Nego. Instr. (6th ed. 1913) sec. 32.
18 C. J. III.
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that the rules on consideration in negotiable paper have become settled
for better or worse,' 2 is not to threaten new confusion by allowing a
seal to have this particular one of its common-law effects.
1
2 Indeed,
some sanction for such a view may even be squeezed from the inad-
vertent language of the act; for if a seal should foreclose the ques-
tion of consideration the seal would decidedly "affect the validity of
the instrument." At least, the act does not provide that validity shall
be effected by the seal.
The reasoning of the court in Dalrymple v. Randall, Gee and
Mitchell Co. (i919, Minn.) 174 N. W. 520 brings up again for discus-
sion the conflict between common-law and the mercantile views on
the sale of chattels. A sold to B 'a carload of grain; resales took
place at once, to C, and then to D. All the parties were members of
the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, and the sales took place under
the rules of that organization: delivery to be made at the buyer's
instructions, price to be subject to the state weigher's report; bill to
be presented and payment made by two P. M. of the day of the
weigher's report; and the whole transaction to be considered a "cash
sale." B was insolvent; the issue came up between his trustee and A,
to recover the proceeds of the grain, which C paid into court; the
court properly held such proceeds to belong to A. By "cash sale"
it seems clear that a sale was meant in which "title does not pass"
until payment.3 The general ruling in such cases is that delivery
Viewed on its merits, as res integra, the doctrine that consideration is essen-
tial to the validity of a contract is not altogether satisfying, especially as regards
negotiable paper. It is not found under the civil law, and its absence does not
seem to greatly hinder the course of business. Cf. (I919) 28 YALE LAW
JouRNAL, 621, esp. 64o ff. Of course no consideration is on the Continent
necessary to the validity of a bill of exchange. Lorenzen, Conflict of Laws
Relating to Bills and Notes (gi9) 28. That our own mores require more
promises to be enforceable than are covered by the current academic definition
of consideration is proved by some of the developments in the law of trusts;
by the pugnacious persistence of. the sealed instrument; and especially by the
steady extension of "consideration" to cover new sets of fact. So, e. g. the
development of the looser estoppel concepts to require the "making-good" of
promises-on which see Anson, Contracts (3d Am. ed. by Corbin, i919) 124, n.-
and (a situation which closely resembles an ex post facto specific performance)
the "shutting of the mouth" of one who would set up a state of fact other
than that on which his adversary is taken to have relied: for instance, in a
suit by a conditional vendor against a subvendee, under acts requiring record of
conditional sales. Ewart, Estoppel (igoo) is suggestive and full of ililustration
of the tendency.
"a So Lacey v. Hutchinson (igog) 5 Ga. App. 865, 64 S. E. 1O5. It will be
remembered, however, that the N. I. L. has not been adopted in Georgia. The
Georgia rule also conduces to uniformity, now that the law of sealed instru-
ments has become so multiform by statutory change.
"The most notable phenomena of the "passing of title" are of course (i)
that the seller can recover from the buyer the full purchase price, and cannot
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before payment raises a presumption, and is itself evidence, that the
seller waived the condition, and that title therefore has passed. But
the question is one of fact; where it has been found that there was
no such waiver, recovery has been allowed even from a subvendee,
when the vendee had procured delivery by "payment" with a check
later dishonored.1" It is hard to agree with the policy behind such a
recovery. It is hard to reconcile it with the law on fraudulent sales,
or on vendors in possession, or even with the law on conditional sales
at common law. At the worst, the vendee in a cash sale is after
delivery in the position of a conditional vendee; but where a condi-
tional vendee is "authorized to put the goods in his stock or other-
wise make it seem that the goods are his," even he, though he "does
not have title," has power to pass title to a bona fide purchaser for
value ;15 the analogy to brokers and consignees, dealing in their own
names with specific carloads of grain, seems hardly escapable. Such
a doctrine would not in any way impugn the court's intimation in the
principal case that an action for conversion would lie against C or
D; for it might well be held that members of an exchange whose cus-
tom was to make sales after a certain manner cannot claim to have
taken without notice of a prior vendor's rights. But should not a
non-broker be protected, who had bought in good faith from B?
The injunction granted by Judge Anderson against the coal strike
can hardly be said to have served a very fruitful purpose. Indeed,
recover, in the event of the buyer's insolvency, either the specific goods or their
proceeds; and (2) that the seller cannot recover either the goods or their
proceeds from a bona fide subvendee. (2), which may of course exist without
(i), is primarily under consideration in the text.
"National Bk. of Commerce, v. Chicago, etc. Ry. (i8go) 44 Minn. 224; 46
N. W. 342. The situation does not appear to be changed by the Uniform Sales
Act, see. 23. It is submitted that the common method of discussion of the
courts, treating the question as one of fact, and making the decisive fact the
actual intent of the parties that the condition be waived or be not waived,
obscures the fundamental issue at stake. As between seller and buyer, intent
may perhaps properly be made a crucial operative fact (though even here such
a test presents embarrassing difficulties, as in the matter of mistake); but when
the question is, whether a bona fide subvendee for value is to be protected
against the vendor, the problem becomes wholly one of policy: under what
states of fact are we going to protect such a purchaser? The seller's intent, of
one kind or another-his willingness to let the buyer take possession of the
goods, or mingle them with his stock, or resell them, or whatnot-may properly
be one of these operative facts; but surely it is not the only one, nor always the
most important; and that nothing necessarily follows from the mere fact that
no title passed to the original buyer, is shown by the illustrations in the text.
" Williston, Sales (i9o9) sec. 329; cf. also sec. 325. In sec. 346, the author
argues strongly in favor of delivery under a cash sale, "with intent that the
buyer may immediately use" the goods "as his own," concluding the seller, on
the question of title, in the absence of pretty clear evidence showing an intention
to reserve the title." Benjamin, Sales (7th Am. ed. 1899) 299f. and I Mechem,
Sales (igoi) sees. 552-7, do not discuss the policy involved.
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so far as the public is concerned, far from producing any coal, the
injunction itself seems to have embittered the miners to a point mak-
ing the problem more difficult of solution and to have raised a political
issue likely to trouble the country for some time to come. In England
a more efficacious remedy is available in the action for a declaration
of rights or declaratory judgment which, had it been available in the
coal strike case, would have achieved all the useful results obtained by
the injunction, namely, a decision that the strike was in violation of
the Lever Act prohibiting limitation of production during the war,
and would have avoided its irritating disadvantages. True it is that
the Attorney General wished in this case not merely to have a deter-
mination that the law was being violated, but also desired to have coal
produced, and thefefore felt the need of specific relief. But it might
have been surmised from experience that no injunction would compel
the miners to dig coal. The final settlement of the strike has been
brought about rather in spite of than because of it. It seems clear,
therefore, that a declaratory action, apart from its other valuable uses,
would have been a most desirable remedy to have available in the coal
strike. It would have informed the miners that they were legally in
the wrong, yet would not have carried with it any order such as was
embodied in the injunction, or raised the political issues consequent
thereon. A bill amending the Judicial Code, introduced by Senator
Fletcher, to enable the Federal courts to render declaratory judg-
ments, is now pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Pos-
sibly this illustration of its utility will stimulate the approval and
passage of the bill. The legislatures of Michigan, Florida and New
Jersey have recently empowered their courts to render declaratory
judgments1 6
Now and again the cleverness of a trick excites one almost to wish
that it had succeeded. But it is gratifying to find the courts clear-
sighted and equal to the trickster. In Wintler Abstract and Loan Co.
v. Sears (i99, Wash.) 184 Pac. 309, what seems to be a novel point
of chattel mortgage law was decided, and decided well. An abstract
company had given the plaintiff a chattel mortgage on its plant, includ-
ing its abstract books. When foreclosure proceedings were begun,
the company proceeded to make photographic copies of its books and
records, and after foreclosure sold the copies to the defendant, who
took them with notice of all the facts. The plaintiff bought the origi-
nal books in at the sale, started an abstract company, discovered com-
petition,--and then sued to recover possession of the copies. Although
in Washington such a mortgage gives only a lien on the chattels, the
court held that the making and sale of the copies had been in viola-
"The remedy is exhaustively discussed by Professor Borchard in (1918) 28
YAI. LAW JOURNAL, I, i05.
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tion of duty. "The same rule of law, which would permit a mortgagee
to enjoin any act which would whQlly or partially destroy the mort-
gaged property, should also permit him to enjoin any act which would
wholly or partially destroy the value of that property." Such recog-
nition that the value of the security lay largely in the right that the
information contained in the books should remain secret, is altogether
sound. The plaintiff failed, to be sure, in the particular action,
because the foreclosure decree and the sheriff's bill of sale had given
an itemized description of the chattels sold, and had failed to include
the photographs among the items. But the court intimates very
strongly that an action of another sort would be maintainable--"one
to enjoin the use of such copies, or for their destruction, or a straight
action for money damages ;" perhaps, even, at the outset, a suit treat-
ing the copies as included within the mortgage. The latter suggestion
would seem to indicate a novel and interesting extension of the law
of accession; the former ones would certainly be sustainable under
the existing rules on unfair competition.
There is a tradition that even great Jove sometimes nodded on his
throne; small wonder if courts sometimes do the like. In McClendon
v. Heisinger (i919, Calif. App.) 184 Pac. 52, a corporation had given
a note to one of its directors; he procured the guaranty of his fellow-
directors on the back of the note, promising them orally that he would
stand his own share of any loss they might thereby incur. The note
being unpaid at maturity, he brought suit on the guaranty. Recovery
was allowed, of the full amount due on the note. The court reasoned
that the parol evidence rule barred the defendants from showing the
oral agreement to vary the terms of their written guaranty; that the
oral agreement could not be used as a collateral contract because
(although a mere promise of partial indemnity) it was a promise to
pay the debt of another within the statute of frauds; and that even
if such were not the case, the collateral contract was inadmissible as a
counterclaim because, until judgment in the instant suit had been
rendered and paid, the defendants would have no "existing" cause
of action under the statute of the state. This last recalls the reason-
ing of Coke; it has not, in recent years, been thought good policy to
force two law-suits to grow where one grew before. The case is in
its day unique. Requiescat oblitus in pace.
